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The ability to rapidly and accurately recognize visual stimuli represents a signiﬁcant computational chal-
lenge. Yet, despite such complexity, the primate brain manages this task effortlessly. How it does so
remains largely a mystery. The study of visual perception and object recognition was once limited to
investigations of brain-damaged individuals or lesion experiments in animals. However, in the last
25 years, new methodologies, such as functional neuroimaging and advances in electrophysiological
approaches, have provided scientists with the opportunity to examine this problem from new perspec-
tives. This review highlights how some of these recent technological advances have contributed to the
study of visual processing and where we now stand with respect to our understanding of neural mech-
anisms underlying object recognition.
Published by Elsevier Ltd.1. Introduction scrutiny. The second stage involves binding this representationIn many ways, the neural processes associated with object rec-
ognition are not unlike those associated with language. Just as
words are formed from a combination of letters, visual objects
are formed from a combination of individual features, such as lines
or textures. By themselves, these features reveal little regarding
the identity of the speciﬁc object to which they belong, much like
individual letters do not convey the meaning of a word. The fea-
tures must be combined in speciﬁc ways, into ‘‘syllables” and
‘‘words”, to create a uniﬁed percept of the object of interest. More-
over, this must be done irrespective of changes in stimulus orien-
tation, illumination, and position to yield object invariance – the
ability to recognize an object under changing conditions. Yet de-
spite this complexity, the brain accomplishes the task effortlessly.
How it does so remains largely a mystery.
Visual processing is thought to consist of two stages. The ﬁrst
stage involves transforming the visual stimulus into neural im-
pulses that are transmitted via the retina and the lateral geniculate
nucleus to the primary visual cortex (V1), where the process of
analyzing the individual features begins. From V1, the visual infor-
mation is distributed to a number of extrastriate visual areas,
including areas V2, V3, V4, and MT, which process shape, color,
motion, and other visual features. These features are then com-
bined to create a complete representation of the image underLtd.
ain and Cognition, National
Bethesda, MD 20892, USA.
leider).with its categorical (i.e., recognizing the collection of features as
a face, a car, etc.) and ultimately its speciﬁc identity (i.e., mother,
father, Ford Taurus, etc.). Historically, these two stages were be-
lieved to occur simultaneously, dependent on the same neural
mechanism (i.e., seeing is recognizing). However, with the discov-
ery of perceptual deﬁcits in recognition in the absence of any sig-
niﬁcant loss of vision (i.e., visual agnosias; see below), it has
become clear that they are separable and likely mediated by differ-
ent anatomical substrates.
Lesion studies in patients have revealed a number of regions in
the occipital and temporal cortices that are intimately linked to vi-
sual processing. Subsequent electrophysiological studies have
uncovered individual neurons that selectively respond to a variety
of visual stimuli, ranging from isolated bars of light to intact faces.
Despite these advances, it is still unclear how object recognition
takes place. How are visual features, such as shapes, colors and tex-
tures encoded by individual neurons (i.e., what is the visual alpha-
bet)? How are these features combined to produce complete
representations of complex objects (i.e., visual ‘‘words”)? And ﬁ-
nally, how are these representations anatomically organized (i.e.,
what is the visual ‘‘dictionary”)?
Over the last 25 years, there have been a number of technolog-
ical advances that have led to major strides in our understanding of
the role of the inferior temporal (IT) cortex in visual processing and
object recognition. This review will discuss how these technologi-
cal advances have contributed to the study of visual processing and
where we now stand with respect to our understanding of object
recognition. We begin with a brief overview of the early studies
that identiﬁed IT cortex as the center of object recognition in the
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iological recording have revealed much about the complex proper-
ties of IT neurons. We then highlight how functional imaging
revolutionized the study of cognitive neuroscience, and visual cog-
nition in particular. Finally, we conclude by discussing how, in the
last decade, efforts to relate ﬁndings from human and non-human
primates have led to more integrated theories regarding the pro-
cessing of faces, which are believed to represent a special category
of visual stimuli.2. Historical overview
2.1. Deﬁcits in perception – ‘‘Seeing” is not ‘‘Recognizing”
Despite a long history of research into brain function, it is only
relatively recently that different cognitive functions have been
attributed to speciﬁc locations within the brain. Prior to the 19th
century, it was believed that cognitive functions were equally dis-
tributed throughout the cerebral hemispheres, subcortical struc-
tures, and even the ventricles (see Gross (1999) for review). The
ﬁrst widely acknowledged theory to attribute speciﬁc functions to
certain brain areas was the ﬁeld of phrenology, pioneered by Gall,
Spurzheim, and others (Gall & Spurzheim, 1809, 1810). Later, more
objective examples of localized cortical function began to emerge.
Paul Broca, a French pathology professor, noted that damage to the
left frontal cortex was often associated with speech impairments
(Broca, 1861). John Hughlings Jackson proposed the existence of a
motor area based on his studies of epileptic patients (Jackson,
1870). Such demonstrations led to the establishment of cerebral
localization as the standard model of brain function, and prompted
the hunt for other examples of specialized regions within the brain.
One of the more active areas of research at this time was the
search for visual centers of the brain. During the late 19th and early
20th century, a number of experiments were conducted that ulti-
mately conﬁrmed the occipital cortex as the primary visual center
in primates. However, these experiments also highlighted an
important dissociation in visual processing between ‘‘seeing” a vi-
sual stimulus and ‘‘recognizing” it. For example, Hermann Munk
(Munk, 1881) and Brown and Schafer (1888) independently found
that monkeys and dogs with temporal lobe lesions would ignore
food and water, even if hungry and thirsty. However, they could
still navigate rooms and avoid obstacles placed in front of them,
indicating that their visual acuity was, at least partially, intact.
Munk referred to this syndrome as ‘‘psychic blindness” to describe
the apparent inability of the animal to understand the meaning of
the visual stimuli presented. This was in contrast to ‘‘cortical blind-
ness”, which referred to the complete loss of vision that followed
extensive occipital lobe lesions.
Psychic blindness, later renamed ‘‘visual agnosia”, has since
been demonstrated in humans who suffered damage to the occip-
ital and temporal cortices (see Farah (2004) for review). Two
separate forms of visual agnosia have been characterized.
Apperceptive agnosia, which occurs after diffuse damage to the
occipital and temporal cortices, affects both early and late visual
processing. Patients suffering from apperceptive agnosia are
impaired at simple discrimination tasks, have difﬁculty copying
pictures, and cannot name or categorize objects. Patients suffering
from associative agnosia, on the other hand, can successfully
identify and copy shapes. However, their ability to associate any
meaning with the images is severely impaired. Associative agnosia
often involves damage to the inferior portions of the posterior
cortex, the ventral occipital cortex and/or the lingual and fusiform
gyri in the posterior temporal lobe.
The detailed studies of perceptual deﬁcits in patients suffering
from associative agnosia foreshadowed much of what we nowknow about higher-order visual processing and the cortical mech-
anisms associated with object recognition. First, it was shown that
the inability of patients to categorize or identify a given stimulus
was unaffected by changes in viewpoint, size, orientation, or any
other ‘‘low-level” manipulation (e.g., McCarthy & Warrington,
1986). This ﬁnding conﬁrmed that the disorder was not associated
with an impairment in visual acuity per se, but in linking the phys-
ical features of a stimulus with its meaning. In turn, this implied
that the brain areas associated with object recognition should be
equally insensitive to such changes (i.e., show object invariance).
Second, it was shown that perceptual deﬁcits could be restricted
to speciﬁc visual categories. Joachim Bodamer (1947) reported
ﬁndings from several cases of patients who lacked the ability to
recognize familiar faces, which he termed prosopagnosia. In cases
of pure prosopagnosia, the ability to classify and categorize non-
face stimuli is unimpaired (see Damasio, Damasio, and Van Hoesen
(1982) for review). In other instances, a patient may be more im-
paired for certain categories compared to others (e.g., a greater
impairment for images of living objects such as plants and animals
compared to images of inanimate objects; Warrington & Shallice,
1984). The selective nature of these deﬁcits suggests not only that
the areas responsible for ‘‘seeing” a visual stimulus are distinct
from those responsible for ‘‘recognizing” it, but that the anatomical
substrates for object recognition might be arranged according to
categorical distinctions.
2.2. Identifying the contribution of the inferior temporal cortex to
object recognition
While the involvement of the occipital cortex in vision was
ﬁrmly established by the early 20th century, the role of the tempo-
ral cortex in visual perception was not fully appreciated until sev-
eral decades later. In 1938, Heinrich Klüver and Paul Bucy
conducted a series of lesion experiments in monkeys that produced
a characteristic set of behavioral symptoms (see Klüver, 1948;
Klüver & Bucy, 1938). They noted that monkeys with bilateral
removal of the temporal lobe showed not only decreased emotional
reactivity and increased sexual activity, but also a signiﬁcant
impairment in their ability to recognize and/or discriminate visual
stimuli. This collection of symptoms later became known as the
Klüver–Bucy syndrome. However, these changes in visual ability
were not accompanied by any appreciable loss of vision. It was later
revealed that the visual deﬁcits of the Klüver–Bucy syndrome were
due to selective damage of the inferior temporal neocortex (Blum,
Chow, & Pribram, 1950; Chow, 1961; Iwai & Mishkin, 1969;
Mishkin, 1954; Mishkin & Pribram, 1954). Damage to medially
adjacent temporal-lobe regions (i.e., the amygdala) failed toproduce
visual deﬁcits, but instead led to the social and sexual abnormalities.
The inferior temporal (IT) cortex of monkeys was further di-
vided into architectonically distinct regions, most notably area
TE, located anteriorly along the inferior temporal gyrus, and area
TEO, located posterior to area TE near the posterior middle tempo-
ral sulcus (Fig. 1) (Boussaoud, Desimone, & Ungerleider, 1991;
Seltzer & Pandya, 1978; von Bonin & Bailey, 1947). Later work
showed that damage to area TE resulted in greater deﬁcits in visual
recognition whereas damage to area TEO resulted in greater
deﬁcits in visual discrimination (Cowey & Gross, 1970; Ettlinger,
Iwai, Mishkin, & Rosvold, 1968; Iwai & Mishkin, 1968).
It was known at this time that more posterior visual areas, such
as striate (V1) and extrastriate visual areas, receive visual inputs
from several subcortical structures such as the pulvinar and supe-
rior colliculus (Felleman & Van Essen, 1991). However, lesions of
the pulvinar and superior colliculus repeatedly failed to produce
deﬁcits in visual discrimination (Chow, 1951; Ungerleider &
Pribram, 1977), as one might expect if the region involved in visual
discrimination, namely IT cortex, relied on inputs from these
TE
TEO
sts
amts
pmts
Adapted from Webster et al., 1991
Fig. 1. Lateral view of the monkey brain showing the two architectonic subdivi-
sions of the inferior temporal cortex: area TE and area TEO. amts: anterior middle
temporal sulcus; pmts: posterior middle temporal sulcus; sts: superior temporal
sulcus (from Webster, Ungerleider, & Bachevalier, 1991).
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ﬁrmed that activation of IT cortex depends exclusively on inputs
received from corticocortical connections originating in V1
(Desimone, Fleming, & Gross, 1980; Rockland & Pandya, 1979; Zeki,
1971). They found that bilateral removal of V1 obliterated all visual
responses in IT neurons. However, unilateral lesions of V1 or tran-
section of the forebrain commissures resulted in IT neurons that
only responded to stimuli in the contralateral visual ﬁeld. The
behavioral signiﬁcance of this corticocortical pathway could be
seen in the crossed-lesion experiments conducted by Mishkin
and colleagues in the 1960s (see Mishkin, 1966). They combined
V1 lesions in one hemisphere with lesions of IT cortex in the oppo-
site hemisphere and found no visual impairment. Presumably, vi-
sual inputs from V1 of the intact hemisphere could still reach the
contralateral IT cortex via the forebrain commissures. However, if
the forebrain commissures were cut, thus completely isolating
the intact IT cortex from its V1 input, the animals would exhibit
profound visual deﬁcits. One would not expect such a deﬁcit if IT
cortex could still obtain sufﬁcient visual information via subcorti-
cal pathways.
2.3. Neurons in IT cortex are selective for complex stimuli
In 1969, Gross and colleagues reported on the ﬁrst electrophys-
iological recordings from individual neurons in IT cortex. They
found that the majority of neurons in IT cortex (approximately
80%) are visually responsive, displaying both excitatory and sup-
pressed responses to visual stimuli (Gross, Bender, & Rocha-
Miranda, 1969; Gross, Rocha-Miranda, & Bender, 1972). Neurons
in IT cortex were found to have very large receptive ﬁelds relative
to earlier visual areas, often spanning both hemiﬁelds and almost
always including the center of gaze (Gross et al., 1972). However,
what was perhaps most noteworthy about neurons in IT cortex is
their strong selectivity for complex shapes, including faces and ob-
jects (e.g., Fig. 2) (Bruce, Desimone, & Gross, 1981; Desimone,
Albright, Gross, & Bruce, 1984; Gross et al., 1972; Kobatake &
Tanaka, 1994; Perrett, Rolls, & Caan, 1982; Rolls, Judge, & Sanghera,
1977; Tanaka, Saito, Fukada, & Moriya, 1991). Moreover, this selec-
tivity was shown to be insensitive to changes in size and location
(Desimone et al., 1984), as predicted by the earlier neuropsycho-
logical evidence. The majority of these early electrophysiological
studies were done in anesthetized animals, demonstrating that
the unique sensitivity of IT neurons to complex shapes is not aproduct of top-down or attentional factors but is intrinsic to the
neurons themselves.
The discovery of neurons selective for speciﬁc objects in IT cor-
tex had profound repercussions on theories concerning object rec-
ognition. Some years earlier, Konorski (1967) had postulated the
existence of ‘‘gnostic” units, which are, in theory, individual neu-
rons that signal the presence of a particular object. Such a neuron
would presumably code for all iterations of this object – across
changes in size, viewpoint, location, etc. The concept of gnostic
units was later reworked into the ‘‘The Grandmother Cell Hypoth-
esis”, a term ﬁrst credited to Jerry Lettvin (see Gross, 2002). If ob-
ject recognition proceeds along a strictly hierarchical pathway in
which selectivity among neurons gets progressively more complex,
one should theoretically be able to locate a particular neuron or
small population of neurons that responds selectivity to a particu-
lar object or person, such as one’s grandmother. Taking this one
step further, if we were to destroy this neuron (or population of
neurons), we would lose the ability to recognize said grandmother.2.4. Summary
The progressive accumulation of information regarding the
properties of visual cortex ultimately led to the hypothesis of a vi-
sual recognition pathway, stretching from V1 to area TE (the ven-
tral stream or ‘‘what” pathway; Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982). A
second visual pathway, stretching from V1 to parietal cortex was
postulated to process visuospatial information (the dorsal stream
or ‘‘where” pathway). As one moves along both pathways, there
is a progressive loss of retinotopic information and a progressive
increase in convergence among neuronal projections (Shiwa,
1987; Weller & Kaas, 1987; Weller & Steele, 1992). For the ventral
visual pathway, this could account for the insensitivity of IT neu-
rons to spatial location, size, and viewpoint: invariance necessary
for object recognition.
One assumption based on this evidence is that object recogni-
tion is a serial process that proceeds through a chain of hierarchi-
cally organized areas beginning with early visual areas responsible
for analyzing simple visual features (e.g., lines, color, etc.), to highly
selective areas that respond to individual categorical exemplars
(e.g., faces). Neurons within these end-stage areas (i.e., a ‘‘gnostic”
or ‘‘grandmother” neuron) would presumably encode a complete
representation of a given object. It was eventually pointed out,
however, that if objects were indeed encoded by individual neu-
rons, there would be an insufﬁcient number of neurons to encode
all possible objects, and thus the concept of such a sparse-encoding
scheme fell out of favor. Nonetheless, it did leave the community
with two critical, and as of yet, unanswered questions. First, how
are objects represented, if not by ‘‘grandmother” or ‘‘gnostic” neu-
rons? And second, what is the relationship of such object represen-
tations to visual agnosias? In the remainder of this review, we will
highlight several research avenues followed over the last 25 years
that have attempted to address these fundamental questions.3. Building object representations in the inferior temporal
cortex
3.1. ‘‘Combination coding”: representing complex objects through
combinations of simpler elements
The 1980s and 1990s saw a number of electrophysiological
studies attempting to characterize the basic response properties
of IT neurons and their relationship to object recognition. What
rapidly became clear was that IT neurons show a wide range of
stimulus preferences that do not immediately lend themselves to
an obvious organizational scheme. Unlike neurons in earlier visual
Example 1
Example 2
Adapted from Bruce et al., 1981
Adapted from Desimone et al., 1984
Fig. 2. Two examples of face-selective neurons recorded in the temporal cortex of anaesthetized monkeys. Example 1 was recorded from the superior bank of the superior
temporal sulcus (from Bruce et al., 1981). Example 2 was recorded from the inferior temporal cortex (from Desimone et al., 1984). Both neurons responded vigorously to
images of human and monkey faces. However, their activity decreased signiﬁcantly when presented with scrambled versions of those images, or other non-face stimuli.
L.G. Ungerleider, A.H. Bell / Vision Research 51 (2011) 782–799 785areas such as V1, which are organized retinotopically, or V2, which
are organized into modules according to functional properties (e.g.,
color), neurons in IT cortex did not, at ﬁrst, seem to be organized
according to any recognizable scheme.
In 1984, Desimone and colleagues performed one of the ﬁrst
systematic studies of the neuronal properties of IT neurons. They
compared the responses of IT neurons in anesthetized monkeys
to a wide array of stimuli, ranging from simple shapes, such as bars
and circles, to complex stimuli, such as faces and snakes. They
found that while a small subset of neurons responded selectively
to faces and hands, the majority responded to a variety of different
simple stimuli. In the latter case, they attempted to identify the
critical features of the stimulus that were responsible for driving
individual neurons by presenting cutouts or otherwise altered ver-
sions of the stimuli (see also Schwartz, Desimone, Albright, &
Gross, 1983). They found that the majority of visually responsive
neurons required complex shapes, textures, colors or some combi-
nation thereof to be maximally activated.Several years later, Tanaka and colleagues developed a more
sophisticated stimulus reduction algorithm that allowed them to
better characterize the critical features that activated each sam-
pled neuron (Fujita, Tanaka, Ito, & Cheng, 1992; Ito, Tamura,
Fujita, & Tanaka, 1995; Kobatake & Tanaka, 1994; Tanaka et al.,
1991). They found that neurons in the posterior one-third of IT
cortex (area TEO) could be maximally activated by bars or circles,
whereas those in the anterior two-thirds of IT cortex (area TE) re-
quired more complex arrangements of features to elicit a maximal
response (e.g., Fig. 3). These critical features were often small
groups of elements derived from intact real-world objects. Tanaka
and colleagues proposed that objects might be represented by a
small number of neurons, each sensitive to the various features
of that object (‘‘combination coding”; Fig. 4). The beneﬁt of
combination over sparse coding is that the former is much more
ﬂexible, allowing for limitless representations through the inte-
gration of the responses from different sets of feature-selective
neurons.
Reprinted from Tanaka, 1996
5 deg
40 sp/s
1 s
1.0
1.08
0.59 1.74 0.68
0.02 0.10
Fig. 3. Systematic reduction of real-world object reveals feature selectivity of IT
neurons. Responses of an IT neuron to intact (top panel) and systematically reduced
versions of a water bottle. Inset numbers above the histograms represent the
normalized response magnitudes relative to the response to the intact image.
Stimulus presentation window is indicated by horizontal line below each histogram
(from Tanaka, 1996).
Fig. 4. Real-world objects represented by combinations of different features.
Similar to how individual syllables are combined to create words, ‘‘combination
coding” suggests that objects are represented by neurons (or small populations of
neurons) each coding for the different complex features that comprise the object
(see Tanaka (1996) for review).
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‘‘object-based” models of object recognition, which were all, more
or less, based on the principle of simpler shapes being combined to
produce complex representations. Perhaps the most well known of
these is the theory of ‘‘Recognition-by-Components” (RBC), ﬁrst
proposed by Biederman (1987). Similar to combination coding,
RBC proposed that objects are represented through various combi-
nations of more primitive shapes. What was particularly intriguing
about RBC is that it constrained these primitives to a set of no more
than 36 geometric icons or ‘‘geons” (Fig. 5A). These geons were
thought to be distinguished from one another on the basis of ﬁve
properties: curvature, collinearity, symmetry, parallelism, and
cotermination.
Object-based models of object recognition make certain predic-
tions about what one might expect to ﬁnd at the neuronal level. For
example, object-based models predict the existence of neuronssensitive to intermediate shapes (e.g., geons). Tanaka and col-
leagues were among the ﬁrst to provide direct neurophysiological
evidence for object-based models of object recognition – speciﬁ-
cally, neurons that respond selectively and most strongly to
decomposed versions of real-world objects. This was followed up
by an extensive examination of an intermediate stage along the vi-
sual pathway by Connor and colleagues, which provided further
support for object-based models.
Pasupathy and Connor (1999, 2001, 2002) measured the re-
sponses of neurons in area V4 to a large set of contoured shapes,
each with a different number of convex projections (2–4), different
orientations, and degrees of curvature (Fig. 5B). They found that
neurons in V4 responded most strongly to single contours or com-
binations of contours, arranged in particular conﬁgurations (e.g.,
acute convexity located in the lower right of the stimulus, acute
convexity immediately adjacent to a shallow concavity, etc.; see
example in Fig. 5C). Notably, this tuning remained constant when
the particular conﬁguration was placed within a variety of more
complex shapes, thus illustrating how a single neuron might par-
ticipate in the coding of many different complex objects.
Later, Brincat and Connor (2004, 2006) reported similar ﬁndings
in posterior IT cortex (i.e., area TEO). They further found that some
neurons within this region encoded shape information at multiple
levels: an initial visual response that represented the simple con-
tour fragments and a second, later response that differed according
to how the various shape fragments were combined. This biphasic
property is very similar to that found among neurons in anterior IT
cortex as described by Sugase and colleagues (1999) and others
(e.g., Tamura & Tanaka, 2001; see below). Brincat and Connor in-
ferred that the second phase of the response represented the out-
come of a recursive network process responsible for constructing
selective responses of increased complexity.
These data suggest that neurons in V4 and posterior IT cortex
might serve to identify and discriminate between the primitive
‘‘geons” described in Biederman’s RBC theory. At the very least,
these data show how neuronal selectivity progresses from simple
line segments (in V1) to simple curves (in V2), to complex curves
or combination of curves (in V4 and posterior IT cortex), and ﬁnally
to complex shapes such as faces and hands (in anterior IT cortex).
Object-based models are considered to be ‘‘view-independent”
because they rely on hard-coded representations of geons (or sim-
ilar primitives) encompassing all possible orientations. As such, the
orientation of the object being examined is irrelevant provided the
various components can be recognized and distinguished from one
another. An alternative to such models are the so-called ‘‘view-
dependent” or ‘‘image-based” models of object recognition
(Logothetis & Sheinberg, 1996; Tarr & Bulthoff, 1998). These mod-
els propose that objects are represented by multiple independent
views of that object. Immediate criticisms of these image-based
(view-dependent) models include the unlikelihood that we could
store all possible viewpoints for all objects in our environment
(i.e., ‘‘combinatorial explosion”) or that we are so limited in our
recognition abilities that we can only recognize a given object if
we have previously seen it in that precise conﬁguration. Therefore,
to overcome these criticisms, image-based models assume that the
brain is somehow able to extrapolate a more complete representa-
tion of a given object from an incomplete collection of experienced
viewpoints. Despite this assumption, such models do predict that
subjects should be faster at recognizing objects when presented
in familiar vs. unfamiliar viewpoints – which is indeed the case
(e.g., Humphrey & Khan, 1992). Bulthoff and Edelman (1992) eval-
uated the ability of human subjects to correctly identify previously
unfamiliar objects when presented in unfamiliar orientations.
Subjects were ﬁrst presented a series of 2D images of an unfamiliar
object from a limited number of viewpoints. Later, subjects were
presented with new images of the same object from different
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Fig. 5. Object-based (view-independent) models of object recognition. (A) Examples of geometric icons (”geons”) as originally proposed by Biederman (1987), and how they
could be combined to produce representations of real-world objects. (B) Stimuli used by Pasupathy and Connor (2001) to investigate tuning properties of V4 neurons. Stimuli
contained between 2 and 4 projections, separated by 90–180, presented at various orientations. (C) Example of V4 neuron exhibiting tuning to a speciﬁc feature composed of
a particular curvature and angular position.
L.G. Ungerleider, A.H. Bell / Vision Research 51 (2011) 782–799 787perspectives. The ability of subjects to correctly recognize the ob-
jects systematically decreased with greater deviations from the
familiar viewpoints.
Image-based models also predict that neuronal responses
among IT neurons should show evidence of view-dependence,
which has again been demonstrated. Using a paradigm similar to
that of Bulthoff and Edelman (1992), Logothetis and colleagues
demonstrated that monkeys were better at recognizing the objects
when presented in a previously presented viewpoint (as compared
to a novel viewpoint) (Logothetis, Pauls, Bulthoff, & Poggio, 1994).
When they sampled activity from neurons in IT cortex while mon-
keys performed this task, they found that neurons in IT cortex
responsive to the objects were viewpoint dependent, responding
most strongly to one viewpoint and decreasing activity systemati-
cally as the object was rotated away from its preferred orientation
(Logothetis, Pauls, & Poggio, 1995). They proposed that a view-
invariant representation of a given object might be generated by
a small population of view-dependent neurons that can, through
changes in their individual ﬁring patterns, signal the presence of
a given object as well as extrapolate its current orientation.
Evidence for both object-based and image-based models of ob-
ject recognition continues to accumulate, leading most to believe
that the underlying mechanism incorporates aspects of both.
Exemplar level recognition (e.g., discriminating between a Toyota
and a Ford) is addressed particularly well by image-based models,
which are essentially based on storing multiple snapshots of spe-
ciﬁc exemplars. On the other hand, how these snapshots are
grouped according to semantic relationships to perform categorical
distinctions (e.g., cars from chairs) is unclear. For that matter, it is
unclear how object-based models construct categorical groupings,
highlighting one of the many challenges in understanding object
recognition.3.2. IT neurons are organized into columns according to feature
selectivity
The studies cited above, and others like them, detailed the func-
tional role of individual IT neurons in object recognition. Around
the same time, evidence began to emerge that described how neu-
rons in IT cortex might be spatially organized. Early experiments
showed that neuronal activity within IT cortex is better correlated
among pairs of neighboring neurons (within 100 lm) and weakens
signiﬁcantly when the two neurons are separated by more than
250 lm (Gochin, Miller, Gross, & Gerstein, 1991). Similarly, neu-
rons along the same recording track perpendicular to the cortical
surface exhibit similar preferences for visual features (Fujita
et al., 1992). These ﬁndings suggested that neurons might be clus-
tered according to their stimulus preferences.
Critical evidence for a clustered arrangement of IT neurons
came from a landmark study that used optical imaging to investi-
gate the preferences of neurons in area TE. Optical imaging mea-
sures differences in light absorption on the cortical surface based
on the ratio between deoxygenated to oxygenated blood. The ex-
tent to which deoxygenated compared to oxygenated blood ab-
sorbs light varies as a function of wavelength. If a particular
region of cortex is more active than another, a change will occur
in the ratio of deoxygenated vs. oxygenated blood, thereby causing
a change in light absorption that can be measured using sensitive
cameras (Grinvald, Lieke, Frostig, Gilbert, & Wiesel, 1986). Wang
and colleagues (1996) used this technology to show that neurons
in area TE are arranged into patches, spanning approximately
500 lm,whichare spatially distributed according to their selectivity
for complex features. By combining this approachwith electrophys-
iological recordings, Tsunoda and colleagues (2001) demonstrated
that as real-world objects are systematically reduced into their
Adapted from Sigala and Logothetis, 2002
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Fig. 6. Example of an individual IT neuron whose selectivity was shaped by
current task demands. Monkeys were trained to discriminate between different
face caricatures on the basis of four diagnostic features: eye height, eye
separation, nose length, and mouth height. The black trace indicates the average
response to the best feature value (i.e., the exemplar that elicited the strongest
response). The gray trace indicates the average response for the worst feature
value (i.e., the exemplar that elicited the weakest response). When the monkey
was required to discriminate faces on the basis of eye height, for example, the
selectivity of the neuron was shaped according to the appropriate feature (from
Sigala & Logothetis, 2002).
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would normally respond to the elements removed are effectively
silenced.
Studies such as these have shown us how responses from small
populations of neurons, each sensitive to a particular set of fea-
tures that might belong to many different objects, can be combined
to produce a complete representation of a given object. Returning
to the analogy of language, it is as if individual neurons in IT cortex
code for individual syllables that, when combined, spell out differ-
ent words – the number of neurons (or populations of neurons) in-
volved being a function of the complexity of the word/object.
Further, these neurons are organized not according to their recep-
tive ﬁelds, as in earlier visual areas, but according to the similarity
of their preferred features.
3.3. Dynamic properties of IT neurons
In the preceding section, we outlined how electrophysiological
studies combined with optical imaging revealed a potential mech-
anism through which objects might be encoded by small popula-
tions of IT neurons. The sophisticated stimulus selectivity of IT
neurons follows a logical progression of increasing complexity
originating with simple neurons in V1. However, the majority of
the aforementioned studies were performed in anaesthetized ani-
mals, which ignores any potential impact of behavioral factors on
the neural responses. Once investigators began to conduct studies
in awake, behaving animals, it was immediately clear that IT neu-
rons were more ﬂexible in their response properties than had been
originally shown. In the following section, we describe a few of the
many properties of IT neurons that illustrate how their responses
reﬂect far more than the visual features presented to the retina.
Presenting a novel object to a subject naturally captures atten-
tion. New stimuli in the environment could represent a potential
threat, or a new potential for reward. In either case, a new stimulus
warrants further investigation. One way in which IT neurons de-
note familiarity is through repetition suppression, a phenomenon
whereby response magnitudes decrease over repeated presenta-
tions of the same stimulus. Miller and colleagues (1991) trained
monkeys to perform a delayed match-to-sample task in which a
sample image was ﬁrst presented followed by a series of test
images, one after the other. The monkey was required to release
a bar if the test image matched the original sample. The sample
and the match could be separated by as many as four intervening
non-match distractor stimuli, thus requiring the monkey to hold
the identity of the sample image in working memory throughout
the duration of the trial. It was found that responses to the match-
ing test image were attenuated compared to that to the initial sam-
ple. Thus, when the same stimulus was presented more than once
and became increasingly familiar to the animal, the responses to
that stimulus decreased (i.e., ‘‘repetition suppression”). This same
effect was later shown to persist over the course of an entire
recording session (>1 h), after hundreds of intervening stimuli (Li,
Miller, & Desimone, 1993). In essence, repetition suppression en-
ables IT neurons to act as ﬁlters for novel stimuli. Repetition sup-
pression is found throughout the brain (e.g., ventral temporal
cortex, Fahy, Riches, & Brown, 1993; Riches, Wilson, & Brown,
1991; prefrontal cortex, Dobbins, Schnyer, Verfaellie, & Schacter,
2004; Mayo & Sommer, 2008; parietal cortex, Lehky & Sereno,
2007) and is believed to play a critical role in behavioral priming
(McMahon & Olson, 2007; Wiggs & Martin, 1998).
Another example of the ﬂexible nature of IT neurons is how
they can adjust their tuning proﬁles and selectivity according to
the task at hand. For example, through associative learning, it is
possible to dynamically ‘‘retune” IT neurons to respond to addi-
tional stimuli. Sakai and Miyashita (1991) trained monkeys to
memorize pairs of stimuli by ﬁrst presenting them with a cuestimulus followed shortly by two test stimuli. The monkeys were
rewarded for selecting one of the latter two stimuli that made up
an arbitrary pair with the cue stimulus. Initially, neurons in IT cor-
tex responded only to one stimulus of the pair. However, over the
course of the experiment, as the monkeys learned to associate one
stimulus with another, a subset of neurons responded to both ele-
ments of the pair. The IT neurons had ‘‘learned” to signal the pres-
ence of either element of the pair. Similarly, Sigala and Logothetis
(2002) found that IT neurons could shift their tuning according to
the demands of the current behavioral task. They trained monkeys
to discriminate images of ﬁsh and faces based on a limited set of
diagnostic features (e.g., ﬁn shape, nose length). They found that
IT neurons became tuned to the speciﬁc features necessary to form
these discriminations (Fig. 6).
These studies are a few of many showing how activity among IT
neurons reﬂects more than the presence or absence of certain vi-
sual features in the external environment. Activity in IT cortex
has been shown to be affected not only by stimulus novelty and
experience, associative learning, and task demands but also by spa-
tial attention (e.g., Buffalo, Bertini, Ungerleider, & Desimone, 2005;
Moran & Desimone, 1985) and stimulus value (e.g., Mogami &
Tanaka, 2006). This evidence tells us that IT neurons are not
hard-wired to respond to a particular set of features, but can adapt
dynamically to the current behavioral objectives, making them
ideally suited as the neural substrate for object recognition.3.4. Generating invariant representations through experience
Above, we described how responses among IT neurons decrease
as stimuli become more familiar to the subject (i.e., repetition
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responsible for one of the hallmark characteristics of IT neurons,
position invariance. Position invariance refers to the ability of IT
neurons to maintain their stimulus selectivity regardless of where
the stimulus appears in the visual ﬁeld. For example, if an IT
neuron shows a preference for a particular stimulus (e.g., an image
of a face), that preference will be maintained regardless of where
the face appears in the visual ﬁeld or how large the retinal image
is. This would be true regardless of the absolute magnitude of
the responses. That is to say while the response to a preferred
stimulus might be 50 spikes/s when presented to one location
and 30 spikes/s when presented to another; the response to a
non-preferred stimulus will always be less in both locations (e.g.,
35 and 15 spikes/s, respectively). Expanding on this point, if a given
neuron prefers faces to houses, and houses to fruit, as long as this
ordering of stimulus preference is maintained, the absolute
magnitude of the individual responses (which might change in re-
sponse to changes in size, position, etc.) to the different stimuli is
irrelevant (Li, Cox, Zoccolan, & DiCarlo, 2009). This property,
possibly unique to IT cortex, is extremely advantageous to object
recognition because it allows neurons to signal the presence of a
particular object regardless of the particular viewing conditions.
Li and DiCarlo (2008) proposed that position invariant repre-
sentations could be constructed based on the assumption that tem-
porally contiguous shifts of stimuli correspond to the same object.
In other words, if a given set of features is, at one moment, 10 to
your left and you generate a saccade 10 to the right, then the set of
features that are now located 20 to your left likely belong to the
same object. They argued that over many exposures, IT neurons
could learn to associate a given set of features in one retinal loca-
tion with the same set of features in another. As such, the same IT
neuron would eventually respond to the same set of features,
regardless of where they appear. Li and DiCarlo tested this theory
by determining whether it would be possible to ‘‘fool” a neuron
into responding to two different stimuli as if they were the same
stimulus presented to two different locations (Fig. 7A). While mon-
keys ﬁxated centrally, a preferred stimulus (i.e., a stimulus that
produced a robust response in the neuron currently being re-
corded) was presented in the periphery. When the monkeys gener-
ated a saccade to that stimulus, its identity immediately changed
to a different, non-preferred, stimulus. Initially, the two stimuli
evoked different response magnitudes, which would effectivelyA
Fig. 7. Example of how altered experience reduces selectivity of IT neurons to stimuli p
were presented with a preferred stimulus (i.e., a stimulus that evoked a strong response in
stimulus, its identity changed to that of a non-preferred stimulus (i.e., one that evoked a w
stimuli for 10 multiunit recording sites as a function of the number of swap exposures.
selectivity). However, as the number of swap exposures increased, the difference betw
approximately the same magnitude of response to the two different stimuli (i.e., weak ob
in the two different locations. The effect was speciﬁc to the swap exposure location. This
individual IT neurons (from Li & DiCarlo, 2008).allow neurons further downstream to discriminate between them.
However, over repeated exposures, the difference in response mag-
nitude between the preferred and the non-preferred stimuli (i.e.,
the measure of object selectivity) decreased systematically
(Fig. 7B). One interpretation of this result is that, based on the
new similarity between the magnitudes of the neuronal responses,
the two stimuli were ‘‘seen” as the same object by neurons further
downstream: the ability of such downstream neurons to discrimi-
nate between the two stimuli had been abolished. In the case of
this particular experiment, the effect was limited to one particular
location but, in a natural setting over many such exposures, this
mechanism could result in a single neuron responding to the same
stimulus, regardless of its position in the visual ﬁeld. Presumably, a
similar mechanism could explain not only position invariance but
also size invariance. For example, as we approach or move away
from a given object, the retinal image of that object will increase
or decrease in size, thus recruiting different populations of neurons
in earlier areas of visual cortex. However, the visual features will
remain the same and, over time, neurons in IT cortex could learn
to respond to the different retinal images as the same object. To
our knowledge, this adaptability is unique to neurons within IT
cortex, further emphasizing its particular relevance for object
recognition.
3.5. Summary
Therefore, in contrast to the sparse-encoding scheme originally
suggested by gnostic neurons (i.e., ‘‘Grandmother Cells”), it is now
hypothesized that objects are represented by a population of neu-
rons, each sensitive to different visual features of the stimulus,
moving towards a more distributed encoding perspective of object
representations in IT cortex. In essence, researchers had discovered
the visual alphabet, which appears to be organized into syllables –
syllables that do not necessarily convey meaning, but allow for
great ﬂexibility in the number of objects they can encode. Addi-
tional evidence of the ﬂexibility of IT neurons is their ability to
maintain their high degree of stimulus selectivity over different
image sizes and positions (i.e., size/position invariance), to signal
familiarity vs. novelty, and to adapt to current task demands. Inter-
estingly, these characteristics are all remarkably reminiscent of the
predications regarding the neural correlates of object recognition
made on the basis of the early neuropsychological and behavioralB
resented to different retinal positions. (A) While their ﬁxation was stable, monkeys
the neuron currently being recorded). When the monkey initiated a saccade to that
eak response). (B) Difference between the responses to preferred vs. non-preferred
Initially, the two stimuli evoked signiﬁcantly different responses (i.e., strong object
een the two stimuli decreased to the point where the neurons responded with
ject selectivity). In effect, the neurons responded as if the same stimulus was present
mechanism shows how experience can lead to position invariant responses within
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with the neuropsychological observations in human patients with
agnosias: How can we have a highly speciﬁc deﬁcit for a particular
category of stimuli, which might include all manner of visual fea-
tures, if the neurons encoding those features are distributed
throughout IT cortex? The answer to this question arose as a result
of approaching the problem from a completely different perspec-
tive using an innovative new technology.4. Functional neuroimaging investigations of visual processing
The use of functional neuroimaging has revolutionized the
study of cognitive neuroscience. Prior to the availability of neuro-
imaging techniques, the only method for researchers to examine
the correlation between brain structures and behavior in humans
was to study brain-damaged individuals. Functional neuroimaging
techniques, and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in
particular, provided researchers with the opportunity to examine
brain function in healthy subjects as well as in patient populations
using a non-invasive approach. Interestingly, fMRI does not mea-
sure neuronal activity per se, but instead the hemodynamic re-
sponses that occur as a result of changes in neuronal activity.
Speciﬁcally, fMRI provides an indirect measure of neuronal activity
by taking advantage of differences in the magnetic susceptibility
between oxygenated and deoxygenated hemoglobin. As brain re-
gions become more active, their metabolic demands increase and
local oxygen delivery is enhanced. Oxygenated hemoglobin is dia-
magnetic and produces a strong magnetic signal as compared to
deoxygenated hemoglobin, which is paramagnetic and produces
a weaker signal. Using an MRI scanner, one can obtain a measure
of the relative dependence on oxygenated blood within a given
brain region (i.e., the ‘‘blood oxygen level dependent” or ‘‘BOLD”
signal). Although it is generally accepted that the BOLD signalEc
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Fig. 8. Retinotopic organization of visual cortex revealed by fMRI. Inﬂated and ﬂattened v
V1 to V4. Maps were produced using expanding and rotating checkerboard patterns, reprovides some indication of the neuronal activity in the underlying
brain tissue, the precise physiological basis of the BOLD signal is
still poorly understood.4.1. A ﬁrst glimpse at the intact human brain
By the time functional neuroimaging methods became avail-
able, much was known about the hierarchical organization and
properties of the different visual regions in the monkey brain.
We knew, for example, that a series of interconnected visual areas,
many with independent retinotopic maps, were organized in a
pathway stretching from V1 to area TE in the anterior temporal
lobe (i.e., the ventral visual pathway; see above). Many of the early
neuroimaging studies attempted to determine if humans showed a
similar organization. Haxby and colleagues (1994) used positron
emission tomography (PET) to demonstrate that humans, like
monkeys, show two visual pathways: a dorsal pathway, stretching
from V1 through extrastriate to parietal cortex, which is primarily
concerned with visuospatial processing, and a ventral pathway,
stretching from V1 through extrastriate to temporal cortex, which
is primarily concerned with object processing. Functionally distinct
regions in human cortex along both the dorsal and ventral path-
ways were delineated on the basis of retinotopic fMRI maps (e.g.,
Fig. 8) (DeYoe, Bandettini, Neitz, Miller, & Winans, 1994; Engel
et al., 1994; Huk, Dougherty, & Heeger, 2002; Sereno et al., 1995;
Tootell, Hadjikhani, Hall, et al., 1998; Tootell, Hadjikhani,
Vanduffel, et al., 1998; Tootell, Mendola, Hadjikhani, Liu, & Dale,
1998; Tootell et al., 1997; Wade, Brewer, Rieger, & Wandell,
2002). In monkeys, we know these maps become increasingly less
well deﬁned as one moves anteriorly along the inferior temporal
cortex (see above). Grill-Spector and colleagues (1998) used fMRI
to show a similar trend in humans.Reprinted from Tootell et al., 1998
iews of the human brain showing eccentricity and polar angle maps, stretching from
spectively (from Tootell et al., 1998).
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lowed researchers to identify regions involved in object recogni-
tion on the basis of their functional properties. According to the
monkey literature, regions involved in object recognition not only
showweak retinotopic organization and become increasingly more
selective for complex objects, but also are increasingly less respon-
sive to scrambled images (see above; Bruce et al., 1981; Vogels,
1999). Furthermore, they often show position and size invariance
(i.e., the representations of individual objects remain constant
regardless of their retinal position or size; see above; Ito et al.,
1995). When the sensitivity of the ventral visual pathway in hu-
mans to scrambled images was assessed, the ﬁrst stage at which
regions no longer responded strongly to scrambled images was lo-
cated near the occipitotemporal junction (Grill-Spector et al., 1998;
Kanwisher, Chun, McDermott, & Ledden, 1996; Lerner, Hendler,
Ben-Bashat, Harel, & Malach, 2001; Malach et al., 1995). The under-
lying collection of areas, termed the lateral occipital complex (LOC;
see Grill-Spector, Kourtzi, & Kanwisher, 2001), is believed to be
where regions associated with processing simple visual features
(e.g., lines, simple shapes) transition to those responsible for pro-
cessing more complex visual stimuli (e.g., complex shapes, faces,
scenes, etc.). Shortly thereafter, it was shown that LOC is less sen-
sitive to changes in stimulus size and position as compared to
changes in viewpoint or illumination (Grill-Spector et al., 1999).
This result is consistent with the properties of neurons in IT cortex,
but not of those in earlier visual areas of monkeys (such as V1–V4),
supporting the idea that LOC may be a functional homolog of IT
cortex in monkeys (Grill-Spector et al., 1998; Malach et al., 1995).
4.2. Functional neuroimaging studies reveal neural substrates of
category-selective agnosias
Although LOC exhibited many of the features one associates
with a higher-order object recognition area, including weak reti-
notopy, sensitivity to image scrambling, and size/position invari-
ance, it did not appear to possess the degree of selectivity
necessary to identify speciﬁc objects. Namely, LOC responds
strongly to any object but does not show selective responses to spe-
ciﬁc objects or features. However, anterior to LOC, a number ofFig. 9. Inﬂated views of the human brain showing regions selective for images of faces
parahippocampal gyrus (‘‘parahippocampal place area, PPA”), and images of human body
MT: motion-selective region. (from Spiridon et al., 2006).other brain areas were identiﬁed that were found to be very selec-
tive for speciﬁc categories of objects (Fig. 9). For example, Sergent
and colleagues (1992) identiﬁed regions within the right fusiform
gyrus and anterior superior temporal sulcus selectively recruited
during a face discrimination task. Puce and colleagues (Puce,
Allison, Asgari, Gore, & McCarthy, 1996; Puce, Allison, Gore, &
McCarthy, 1995) and Kanwisher and colleagues (1997) later repli-
cated these ﬁndings using fMRI. The latter group called the fusi-
form activation the ‘‘fusiform face area” (Fig. 9) (FFA; Kanwisher
et al., 1997). Other face-selective regions were also identiﬁed:
one in the ventral occipital cortex (the ‘‘occipital face area”, OFA)
(Ishai, Ungerleider, Martin, Schouten, & Haxby, 1999), another in
the superior temporal sulcus (Haxby et al., 1999), and yet another
in the anterior portion of the temporal lobe (Kriegeskorte,
Formisano, Sorger, & Goebel, 2007; Rajimehr, Young, & Tootell,
2009; Tsao, Moeller, & Freiwald, 2008). The signiﬁcance of these
regions for the processing of face stimuli is best illustrated by the
observation that damage that includes the occipitotemporal cortex
and/or the fusiform gyrus produces acquired prosopagnosia (e.g.,
Landis, Regard, Bliestle, & Kleihues, 1988; Rossion et al., 2003).
In addition to face-selective regions, regions selective for other
visual categories were identiﬁed. An area selectively activated by
locations, places, and landmarks was identiﬁed in the parahippo-
campal gyrus, and termed the ‘‘parahippocampal place area”
(PPA) (Fig. 9) (Epstein & Kanwisher, 1998). Activation of the PPA re-
quires the presentation of surfaces that convey information about
the local environment; random displays of objects (e.g., furniture)
produce minimal responses, but if those same objects are arranged
in such a way as to give the illusion of a room, this area becomes
signiﬁcantly more responsive. As with face-selective regions, dam-
age to the parahippocampal gyrus produces difﬁculties in navigat-
ing familiar locations (‘‘topographical disorientation”; Epstein,
DeYoe, Press, & Kanwisher, 2001).
Along the lateral extrastriate cortex, an area selectively acti-
vated by images of human body-parts was found, the so-called
extrastriate body-part area (EBA) (Fig. 9) (Downing, Jiang, Shuman,
& Kanwisher, 2001). This region was later shown to also respond to
limb and goal-directed movements (Astaﬁev, Stanley, Shulman, &
Corbetta, 2004). There was even the discovery of a region selectiveReprinted from Spiridon et al., 2006
in the fusiform gyrus (‘‘fusiform face area, FFA”), images of places in the adjacent
-parts near the lateral occipitotemporal cortex (‘‘extrastriate body-part area, EBA”).
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called ‘‘visual word form area” (VWFA) was localized to a region
within/adjacent to the fusiform gyrus and was further shown to
respond preferentially to real words compared to nonsense letter-
strings (Cohen et al., 2002). The VWFA is found almost exclusively
in the left hemisphere – the same hemisphere as other language-
related areas, such as Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas (Binder et al.,
1997). Importantly, because we are not born with knowledge
about written words, the existence of VWFA indicates that at least
some category-speciﬁc cortex must arise as a result of experience.
Recently, neuroimaging experiments in monkeys have revealed
similar category-selective regions throughout IT cortex (Fig. 10).
Tsao and colleagues (2003) and later others (Bell, Hadj-Bouziane,
Frihauf, Tootell, & Ungerleider, 2009; Pinsk, DeSimone, Moore,
Gross, & Kastner, 2005; Pinsk et al., 2009) identiﬁed several regions
along the superior temporal sulcus (STS) selectively responsive to
faces (of both monkeys and humans). Recordings from one of these
face-selective regions has demonstrated high proportions of face-
selective neurons (Tsao, Freiwald, Tootell, & Livingstone, 2006). Lo-
cated adjacent to these face-selective regions are regions selective
for monkey body-parts, and regions selective for places have been
found within the STS and along ventral IT cortex (Bell et al., 2009;
Pinsk et al., 2005). Establishing precise homologies between the
two species will require adherence to both anatomical and func-
tional criteria (Rajimehr et al., 2009; Tsao et al., 2008) and is still
debated. Nonetheless, the existence of fMRI-identiﬁed category-
selective regions in the monkey brain provides a clear bridge be-
tween experiments involving fMRI and electrophysiology, greatly
facilitating cross-species comparisons.
In humans, these category-selective regions were shown to be
sensitive to the conscious percept of a stimulus. Tong and
colleagues (1998) presented subjects with an image of a face to
one eye and an image of a house to the other, thereby creating a
bi-stable percept that shifted back and forth between faces and
houses every few seconds. They found that FFA activation
increased when subjects reported perceiving a face whereas PPA
activation increased when subjects reported perceiving a house,
despite both images being present at all times. Moreover, these re-
gions respond to the percept of the stimulus, even in its absence.
Summerﬁeld and colleagues (2006) asked subjects to discriminate
between noisy images of faces and houses. When subjects incor-
rectly reported seeing a face when actually presented with a house,
activation in FFA increased, indicating that the activation was re-
lated more to the percept than to the physical stimulus itself.
How (and when during development) these category-selective
regions originate is still unclear, although there is mountingLeft Hemisphere
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Fig. 10. Inﬂated views of the monkey brain showing regions selective for images of faces,
occipitotemporal sulcus; sts: superior temporal sulcus (from Bell et al., 2009).evidence to suggest that they are not innate but arise through
learning and experience. For example, a number of studies have
demonstrated training and experience-related changes in activa-
tion of temporal cortex. Op de Beeck and colleagues (2006)
scanned subjects before and after discrimination training on a set
of novel objects and found that activation in areas responsive to
the objects increased after training. This increase in signal strength
due to training was not uniform across temporal cortex (i.e., was
not, for example, a non-speciﬁc attentional effect) but rather was
greater in some visual cortical areas (e.g., right fusiform gyrus)
compared to others. Wong and colleagues (2009) offered further
insights into the spatial distribution of training-related increases
in activation. They found that training subjects to discriminate a
set of novel objects at an exemplar (subordinate) level produced
greater and more focal activation in right fusiform gyrus than in
other areas of visual cortex (see also van der Linden, Murre, &
van Turennout, 2008). By contrast, training subjects to discrimi-
nate objects at a categorical level produced more diffuse increases
in activation. Changes in activation may reﬂect an underlying in-
crease in neuronal selectivity among IT neurons that is observed
following discrimination learning (Baker, Behrmann, & Olson,
2002). In some cases, experience-related changes in activation
and selectivity may take place over several years. For example,
although humans are relatively adept at face discrimination at a
very early age (Fagan, 1972; Pascalis, de Schonen, Morton,
Deruelle, & Fabre-Grenet, 1995), face-selective regions (i.e., FFA,
OFA) do not appear until early to late adolescence (Golarai et al.,
2007; Scherf, Behrmann, Humphreys, & Luna, 2007).
To summarize, the existence of brain regions selectively acti-
vated by images from speciﬁc categories offered, for the ﬁrst time,
a clear correlate to some of the category-selective agnosias ﬁrst
characterized over half a century earlier (e.g., prosopagnosia).
Damage to these regions produces perceptual deﬁcits speciﬁc for
these categories. What is perhaps most interesting about these re-
gions is how they respond to all conceptually related stimuli,
regardless of their individual visual features. Images of body-parts,
for example, might include many different shapes and textures but
activate the same small, circumscribed region. This coding mecha-
nism, based on conceptual similarity, is in direct contrast with the
combination coding mechanism, based on visual similarity, cur-
rently proposed in monkeys. The former mechanism appears well
suited for making rapid category-level identiﬁcations but may
not have the selectivity necessary to dissociate individual exem-
plars from within individual categories. On the other hand, combi-
nation coding is well suited to dissociate individual exemplars
based on subtle differences in visual appearance, but has noRight Hemisphere
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Reprinted from Bell et al., 2009
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tual or semantic relationships. Reconciling these two theories will
reveal much about how the brain recognizes both categorical dis-
tinctions and individual exemplars from within categories.Adapted from Thomas et al., 2009
ILF
IFOF
Fig. 11. Diffusion tensor images of patient with congenital prosopagnosia (left
column) and age/gender matched control (right column), plotted on axial slices.
Patients with congenital prosopagnosia show reduced white matter volume in
inferior lateral and inferior fronto-occipito fasciculi (ILF and IFOF), two white matter
tracts that pass through the fusiform gyrus (from Thomas et al., 2009).4.3. Advancements in neuroimaging methods and analyses: category-
selective regions form interconnected networks
Most categories tested have been shown to evoke multiple cat-
egory-selective regions within the human and monkey brains:
Images of faces evoke four in the human occipital and temporal
cortex (FFA, OFA, STS, anterior temporal cortex) and between two
and six in the monkey temporal cortex (Bell et al., 2009; Moeller,
Freiwald, & Tsao, 2008; Pinsk et al., 2005). Places and scenes evoke
activation in the human PPA as well as in a region of the retrosple-
nial cortex (Epstein, Parker, & Feiler, 2008; Park & Chun, 2009;
Walther, Caddigan, Fei-Fei, & Beck, 2009). Similarly, several
place-selective regions in the monkey temporal cortex have been
described (Bell et al., 2009). The existence of multiple regions for
each category strongly suggests the existence of cortical networks
specialized for the processing of different stimulus categories.
Evaluating the architecture and input–output anatomical relation-
ships among regions in distributed networks was once only possi-
ble through terminal tracer experiments in animals. However, new
analytic techniques in fMRI offer the possibility of characterizing
cortical networks using non-invasive approaches (see Bandettini
(2009) for review). Diffusion tensor imaging (DTI), for example,
measures the diffusion of water along axonal ﬁbers, providing both
the location and relative size of white matter tracts between struc-
tures and thus allows investigators to quantify the degree of con-
nectivity between functionally similar regions (Basser, 1995;
Basser, Mattiello, & LeBihan, 1994). DTI has been used to investi-
gate how changes in the connectivity among face-selective regions
in the ventral temporal cortex of humans affect face processing. For
example, patients suffering from congenital prosopagnosia show
reduced volume in the inferior longitudinal fasciculus and inferior
fronto-occipito fasciculus, two white matter pathways that pass
through the fusiform gyrus (Fig. 11) (Thomas et al., 2009). Inciden-
tally, the latter fasciculus has been shown to degrade with age,
which correlates with a reduction in face discrimination abilities
among older subjects (Thomas et al., 2008).
Another analytic technique, called ‘‘functional connectivity”,
estimates connections between brain regions based on the rela-
tionship between activity patterns in different seed regions. These
can be assessed at rest (e.g., resting state connectivity; Greicius,
Krasnow, Reiss, & Menon, 2003; Raichle et al., 2001) or during
the performance of a task (e.g., dynamic causal modeling; DCM;
Friston, Harrison, & Penny, 2003). Resting state connectivity has
been used extensively in the study of neuropsychiatric disorders
(Greicius, 2008). Patients suffering from Alzheimer’s disease show
altered connectivity between the hippocampus, cingulate and pre-
frontal cortices (Wang et al., 2006). Assessing functional connectiv-
ity during task performance can provide insights as to how
connectivity is altered during different behavioral states. Using
DCM, Nummenmaa and colleagues (2009) examined how face-
selective regions in the ventral temporal cortex interact with
attention and oculomotor structures in the frontal cortex to medi-
ate shifts in attention induced by changes in gaze direction.
In monkeys, it is possible to use electrical microstimulation in
combination with fMRI to visualize the connections between areas
(Field, Johnston, Gati, Menon, & Everling, 2008; Tolias et al., 2005).
Moeller and colleagues (2008) used this technique to map the con-
nections among six discrete face-selective regions in IT cortex,
which were found to be strongly interconnected with one another
but not with adjacent regions (Fig. 12), thereby demonstrating thatmonkeys show similar specialized networks to those found in
humans.
Finally, in addition to new experimental methodologies, the last
several years have seen a number of advancements in how imaging
data are analyzed. Traditionally, fMRI data are analyzed by ﬁrst
using a localizer contrast (e.g., faces vs. places) to locate a region
or regions of interest (ROIs; e.g., face-selective regions), and then
restricting subsequent analyses to these isolated voxels. Alterna-
tively, ROIs might be deﬁned anatomically (e.g., hippocampus).
Examining ROIs as isolated entities is highly advantageous because
it restricts the analysis to the regions most likely to show an effect.
However, it also ignores any information that might be contained
within the pattern of activation among voxels outside the ROIs. Re-
cently, investigators have begun to examine these patterns of acti-
vation (e.g., Haxby et al., 2001; Kriegeskorte et al., 2006;
Sapountzis et al., 2010; Oosterhof et al., 2010; Norman et al.,
2006; Naselaris et al., 2010; Kamitani and Tong, 2005; see
Bandettini (2009) for review). For example, Kay and colleagues
(2008) used patterns of activation within early visual areas to iden-
tify which of 120 novel natural images the subject was viewing.
Subjects were ﬁrst shown a set of 1750 natural images while fMRI
data were collected from V1 to V3. These data were used to create a
receptive ﬁeld model for each voxel. The model was then used to
predict the pattern of activation that would result when the sub-
jects were later shown the 120 novel images. Accuracy exceeded
80% – well above chance performance. Using fMRI data in this
way is often referred to as ‘‘brain decoding” and has been used in
a number of recent fMRI studies looking at a variety of cognitive
functions (e.g., Brouwer & Heeger, 2009; Esterman, Chiu, Tamber-
Rosenau, & Yantis, 2009; Macevoy & Epstein, 2009; Reddy,
Tsuchiya, & Serre, 2010; Rodriguez, 2010).
Adapted from Moeller et al., 2008
1 cm
3.3
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Fig. 12. Interconnections between face-selective regions in the monkey temporal cortex revealed using electrical microstimulation and fMRI. Microstimulation applied to a
face-selective region in area TE evoked activation in several nearby face-selective regions, indicating functional connections among them (left panel). Microstimulation
applied outside all face-selective regions failed to evoke activation within any of the face-selective regions (right panel). Similar experiments were conducted to show that all
face-selective regions within the temporal cortex of the monkey are interconnected. AF: anterior fundus; AL: anterior lateral; AM: anterior medial; MF: middle fundus; ML:
middle lateral; PL: posterior lateral (from Moeller et al., 2008).
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conceived ideas about how representations are organized in the
brain. For instance, it is easy to assume that only those regions
identiﬁed using ROI-based analyses process stimuli from a speciﬁc
category and yet pattern analysis might subsequently reveal valu-
able information about that category outside of these ROIs. How-
ever, this leads to the problem of how does one interpret the
results of a pattern-analysis? That is to say – just because an anal-
ysis might provide accurate information, we cannot assume that
this is how the brain actually accomplishes the task. This is a difﬁ-
cult question to address as the answer may change from one study
to another, or from one brain region to another – requiring caution
when applying pattern analysis to fMRI data. Nonetheless, the po-
sitive results obtained thus far from pattern analysis emphasize
the importance of considering activations outside isolated regions
of interest when examining fMRI data.
4.4. Summary
Neuroimaging has allowed researchers to learn much about the
neural substrates of perceptual representations in the human
brain. The demonstration of category-selective regions in ventral
occipital and temporal cortex offers clear correlates to the cate-
gory-selective agnosias observed in humans. Activation within
these category-selective regions appears to be associated with
the conscious perception of stimuli from a given category. Finally,
these regions form interconnected networks specialized for pro-
cessing stimuli from a given category. These data suggest that as
one moves anteriorly along the occipito-temporal pathway, the
neuronal representation of a given stimulus is transformed from
a strict reﬂection of its visual appearance (i.e., a sphere, a rectangle)
to one that incorporates its categorical identity (i.e., a face, a car).
As new analytic techniques evolve, potential for greater insightsinto understanding mechanisms for categorical and exemplar dis-
tinctions will increase.
5. A special case of visual perception – face processing
Given their unique importance to social communication, faces
undoubtedly represent a special category of stimuli with respect
to visual processing. We rely on our ability to distinguish individ-
uals and read their facial expressions in order to understand our
relationships with others and to interpret their intentions. Face
perception is multifaceted, involving face detection, identity dis-
crimination, and the analysis of the changeable aspects of the face
relevant for social context (e.g., facial expressions). In the following
sections, we will describe how studies conducted over the last two
decades have greatly expanded our knowledge of how the brain
codes and interprets face stimuli.
5.1. Face-selective neurons in monkey IT cortex sensitive to socially
relevant aspects of facial stimuli
Since the earliest recording studies, researchers have found
neurons in IT cortex that are highly selective for face stimuli. More-
over, unlike the majority of IT neurons in the monkey that respond
systematically to reduced versions of real-world objects, face-
selective neurons typically respond only to intact images of faces
(see above; Desimone et al., 1984). If the individual elements of
the face are rearranged or parts removed (e.g., eyes, mouth), the
ﬁring rates of these neurons drop signiﬁcantly (Desimone et al.,
1984; Hasselmo, Rolls, & Baylis, 1989; Perrett et al., 1982). Thus,
face-selective neurons in monkey IT cortex appear to be sensitive
to the holistic percept of an intact face. Given this degree of spec-
iﬁcity, face-selective neurons likely represent the primary neural
substrate for face processing in the primate brain. As such, one
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face detection, discrimination, etc.) within the neuronal responses,
which is indeed the case. For example, in addition to signaling the
presence of a face, face-selective neurons also appear to be sensi-
tive to a number of socially relevant cues, such as head orientation
(Desimone et al., 1984; Perrett et al., 1985) and gaze direction (Per-
rett et al., 1985). Neurons responsive to different facial expressions
(e.g., open-mouth threat) have also been identiﬁed (Hasselmo
et al., 1989) and activation throughout IT cortex has been shown,
using fMRI, to be modulated in response to different facial expres-
sions (Hadj-Bouziane, Bell, Knusten, Ungerleider, & Tootell, 2008;
Hoffman, Gothard, Schmid, & Logothetis, 2007). Face-selective neu-
rons can therefore encode both the presence of a face as well as the
social content of the face image – but how might this be accom-
plished by a single neuron?
Sugase and colleagues (1999) offered a potential solution. In
their study, monkeys were trained to maintain central ﬁxation
while visual stimuli were presented foveally. The stimuli included
images of monkey and human faces, each with a different identity
and facial expression. They found that responses among IT neurons
often consisted of an early phase followed by a later phase (Fig. 13).
The early phase, which occurred approximately 100–150 ms fol-
lowing stimulus onset, encoded the global features of the stimulus
that were relevant for face detection or simple discrimination (e.g.,
between a face and a non-face, or between a monkey face and a hu-
man face). The later phase, which occurred approximately 50 ms
later, encoded the ﬁne features of the stimulus, such as those nec-
essary to discriminate between individual faces or between differ-
ent facial expressions.
The encoding of individual facial identities has also been
hypothesized to occur at the level of individual neurons. Leopold
and colleagues (2006) have suggested that facial identity is en-
coded by single neurons using a norm-based encoding scheme.
According to this theory, neurons in IT cortex signal the distance
of a given face from a prototypical or ‘‘mean” face along multiple
dimensions, each representing different diagnostic features. ThisNeutral
Identity 2
Pout-lips
Identity 1
Fig. 13. Example of an IT neuron encoding multiple levels of information related to face
100–150 ms following stimulus onset. The magnitude of the second phase of the response
identity of the facial image (from Sugase et al., 1999).scheme, in contrast to the earlier ‘‘Grandmother Cell Hypothesis”,
allows for inﬁnite ﬂexibility because it does not rely on previous
viewings or many stored representations. A similar norm-based
encoding scheme has been proposed in humans (Lofﬂer,
Yourganov, Wilkinson, & Wilson, 2005).
The studies cited above have highlighted the capabilities of indi-
vidual neurons to represent different facial features. Another impor-
tant, and as of yet unanswered, question is how do these neurons
contribute to behavior? Surprisingly, only a few studies have ad-
dressed this question directly. Eifuku and colleagues (2004) trained
monkeys to perform a face identity discrimination task in which
monkeys were ﬁrst presented with a sample face stimulus followed
by several potential target faces. Themonkeyswere required topush
a lever when the target stimulusmatched the identity of the sample
stimulus. The twomatching stimuliwere pictures of the same famil-
iar person, but not necessarily fromthe sameviewpoint, thus requir-
ing the monkey to make true face identiﬁcations and not simply
exemplar matches. It was found that face-selective neurons in the
anterior IT cortex showed correlations between the latency of the
neuronal response and the latency of the behavioral response, sug-
gesting that these neurons directly contributed to the perceptual
decision.More recently, Afraz and colleagues (2006) provided direct
evidence linking the responses of face neurons to the perception of a
face. After locating a cluster of face-selective neurons, they applied
electrical microstimulation while monkeys performed a difﬁcult
face vs. non-face discrimination task. When stimulation was
applied, monkeys were signiﬁcantly more likely to report a face,
regardless of the identity of the visual stimulus.
Individual face-selective neurons have a remarkable capacity to
encode different aspects of the facial image. A single neuron not
only signals the presence of a face within the visual ﬁeld, but also
conveys information about the identity of the face as well as its
emotional content. Furthermore, the activity of these neurons cor-
relates with performance in face detection and face discrimination
tasks, suggesting they contribute directly to perceptual decisions
involving faces.Adapted from Sugase et al., 1999
Full Open-mouthed Mid Open-mouthed
perception. Each face evokes a sharp but brief response, beginning approximately
, beginning approximately 50 ms later, differs according to the facial expression and
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face processing
In the human, fMRI has been used extensively to investigate not
only the sensitivity of the different face-selective regions but also
how they might be functionally organized. Evaluating the identity
and socially relevant information of a face (e.g., facial expression
and gaze direction), for example, requires greater attention to indi-
vidual facial features. Therefore, areas showing greater sensitivity
to individual facial features are likely involved in extracting this
information. Hoffman and Haxby (2000) probed the relative inﬂu-
ence of facial identity vs. gaze direction in face-selective regions by
manipulating selective attention to one or the other. They hypoth-
esized that areas more sensitive to facial identity would show
greater activation when subjects were cued to attend to the iden-
tity of a face stimulus as compared to when subjects were cued to
attend to the gaze direction. They found that selective attention
had a greater effect on identity in face-selective regions in the lat-
eral and ventral temporal regions and a greater effect on gaze
direction in regions located in the STS. Similar ﬁndings linking
identity discrimination with face-selective regions in the lateral
and ventral temporal cortex have been reported by others (e.g.,
Eger, Schyns, & Kleinschmidt, 2004; Fox, Moon, Iaria, & Barton,
2009; Rhodes, Michie, Hughes, & Byatt, 2009; Winston, Henson,
Fine-Goulden, & Dolan, 2004). Expanding on this research, Haxby
and colleagues proposed that the face-processing network consists
of two separate systems. The core system, which includes the
occipito-temporal face-selective regions (e.g., FFA, OFA, STS), is pri-
marily responsible for the visual analysis of facial features (for
identity discrimination, processing of emotional expressions,
etc.). The extended system, which includes the amygdala, anterior
temporal regions, and the prefrontal cortex, is primarily responsi-
ble for the further analysis of the changeable aspects of the face
and for interacting with other systems that rely on face processing
(e.g., speech perception). Using DCM (see above), Fairhall and Ishai
(2007) evaluated the connectivity between these two systems.
They found that correlations between areas in both the core and
extended systems changed depending on the type of face pre-
sented. Emotional faces, for example, increased the strength of
functional connections between the FFA and the amygdala, inferior
frontal gyrus, and orbitofrontal cortex – all structures linked to the
processing of emotional expressions (Adolphs, Damasio, & Tranel,
2002).5.3. Summary
The study of face processing in the primate brain is an ideal
example of the beneﬁts of combining several approaches across
multiple species to address a single problem. The ﬁrst sugges-
tions of a specialized face-processing network came from lesion
work in humans, which was later supported by electrophysiolog-
ical recordings in monkeys. Later still, neuroimaging studies
bridged the gap between these two approaches, greatly increas-
ing our understanding of this network at multiple levels. We
now know that individual neurons can encode multiple levels
of information regarding face stimuli and that these neurons
are concentrated into several patches distributed throughout
the temporal cortex. Based on work obtained in humans, it ap-
pears that these patches are functionally organized into different
pathways, each specialized for different aspects of face process-
ing. One of the next steps will be to determine how the informa-
tion encoded by the face-processing networks in the temporal
cortex is used by downstream structures, such as those within
the prefrontal cortex, to form decisions about face discrimination
and social behavior.6. General summary
In this review, we have described a few of the many discoveries
in object and face processing made over the last 25 years. Techno-
logical advances, such as neuroimaging, combined with new ap-
proaches, such as physiological studies in behaving animals, have
provided many insights that were not possible in the past. We have
learned how the temporal cortex contains networks for processing
different categories of visual stimuli, each of which consists of dif-
ferent regions selective for these categories. We have learned
about the relative contributions of these regions to the different as-
pects of object processing, particularly face processing. Finally, we
have identiﬁed a combination coding mechanism that could
underlie how individual objects might be represented.
Yet, despite this progress, many unanswered questions remain.
How precisely does the brain integrate individual visual features
into a single percept and, perhaps more importantly, how does it
bind that percept to the object’s semantic identity? Does the exis-
tence of a category-selective region in cortex indicate that all pro-
cessing for said category takes place within that region? For that
matter, how are individual exemplars from within a given category
recognized and what about stimuli from categories that do not
have a specialized region (e.g., fruit)?
Howwill we answer these questions in the future?Much like the
progress made in the last 25 years, discovering new information
about the brain during the next 25 years will likely require new ap-
proaches. For example, many laboratories have already started to
apply genetics to the study of visual perception. Two recent studies
have compared the ability of monozygotic and dizygotic twins to
recognize and discriminate faces in order to evaluate the genetic ba-
sis of face recognition (Wilmer et al., 2010; Zhu et al., 2010). Simi-
larly, others studying congenital prosopagnosia, a condition in
which patients are born with an impaired ability to recognize faces,
havebegun to includegenotyping andheritability assays to evaluate
the role of genetics in face processing disorders (Gruter, Gruter, &
Carbon, 2008; Kennerknecht, Pluempe, & Welling, 2008; Lee,
Duchaine, Wilson, & Nakayama, 2009). As new experimental tech-
niques are applied, yielding fresh perspectives, our understanding
of the brain and the ‘‘visual alphabet” will continue to evolve.
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